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ABSTRACT. The aim of this article is to contribute to the recently revived debate over the norma-
tivity of Foucault’s genealogical method. More specifically, I shall respond to Fraser’s charge that 
Foucault’s rejection of humanism is unjustified because he cannot state why a totally panopticized, 
autonomous society would be objectionable. After dismissing a non-normative defence strategy 
of Foucault’s work, I shall proceed as follows: firstly, I shall clarify Foucault’s model of critique as 
a practice of problematization geared to free his addressees from their captivation to the system of 
truths sustaining the power mechanisms of modern biopolitics. Secondly, I shall argue that Fra-
ser’s society should be resisted because it would reproduce this regime of captivity, thereby ob-
structing the exercise of freedom as self-transformation. Thirdly, I shall contend that Foucault’s 
normative orientation to a post-humanist conception of freedom as self-transformation finds a 
contextual, explanatory account in his attempt to revitalize the emancipatory project of Enlighten-
ment modernity through a transformative problematization of our normative commitments. 
Moreover, I shall show that the standard of validity of this effort is represented by Foucault’s ex-
emplary embodiment of the critical ethos of the Enlightenment in both his style of existence and 
theoretical activity. Finally, the article terminates by illustrating three shortcomings of Foucault’s 
normative approach.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The question of the normative framework characterizing Foucault’s genealogical critique 
of modernity has been the focus of a long and vexed debate. Since the 1980s, early critics 
accused him of lacking the normative resources necessary to justify his call for critique 
and resistance against modern forms of power. Although he obliquely addressed similar 
remarks in his later works, Foucault could never engage in a more direct confrontation 
due to his death in 1984. As a result, the defence of his enterprise passed on in the hands 
of his advocates, whose responses had the initial merit of emphasising the tendentious 
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nature of the allegations levelled at him.1 Subsequent contributions, though, took the 
shape of a confrontational dialogue, with the consequence that the debate surrounding 
Foucault and normativity lost much of its pull and faded somewhat into the background.  
With the English publication of his later articles, interviews, and Collège de France lec-
tures, however, a number of scholars have recently revitalized this debate by shifting the 
latter towards an investigation of the stance Foucault endorses in relation to the question 
of the normativity of critique and resistance. Their interpretive proposals are wide-rang-
ing, and I certainly do not pretend to examine all of them.2 Still, here I shall discuss some 
prominent readings which follow two key strategies. The first strategy identifies the dis-
tinctive feature of Foucault’s genealogy in its allegedly non-normative and descriptive 
nature, whereby his detractors would erroneously condemn Foucault for being unable to 
secure a project he was never engaged in. The second strategy, instead, argues that Fou-
cault does make normative claims, but the specific kind of normativity he opts for cannot 
be reconciled with the requirements put forward by his critics. My goal will be to contrib-
ute to this second line of argument by elaborating an alternative account of the normative 
dimension of Foucault’s thought, which I shall frame as a response to the charge of genetic 
fallacy raised at him by Nancy Fraser: without a post-humanist paradigm of freedom, 
Foucault cannot make the case for his normative rejection of the hypothetical picture of a 
fully panopticized society where humanist ideals would be realized.  
To this end, I shall divide my paper into four sections. Section 1 will present Fraser’s 
reasoning and illustrate the shortcomings marking a non-normative defence of Foucault. 
Laying the groundwork for a correct appraisal of the interpretative-evaluative orientation 
underlying his project, section 2 will clarify Foucault’s largely implicit model of critique. 
More specifically, I shall maintain that the latter consists in a practice of problematization 
geared to emancipate us from our captivation to the ‘regime of truth’ shaping our experi-
ence, i.e., the system of intelligibility for thought and action resulting from the conver-
gence of the discourses of humanism with the governmental mechanisms of modern bio-
politics. Accordingly, in section 3 I shall be able to argue that, for Foucault, Fraser’s picture 
of an autonomous society should be resisted because it would ingrain our subjection to 
this very same regime, thereby impeding us from exercising our capacity for freedom as 
a practice of self-transformation. While he rejects the demand for a discursive justification 
of such a post-humanist conception of freedom, I shall show that Foucault’s later writings 
on the Enlightenment can be taken to supply a context-sensitive, explanatory account of 
his normative stance. In a nutshell, submitting current normative commitments to a radi-
cal problematization aimed at their transformation is the best way for him to be true to 
the emancipatory ideals of Enlightenment modernity. In the absence of further grounds, 
then, I shall claim that one can find the ultimate standard for assessing the credibility of 
Foucault’s normative position in his exemplary embodiment of the critical ethos of the 
 
1 Michael Kelly, “Introduction,” in Critique and Power: Recasting the Foucault/Habermas Debate, ed. Michael 
Kelly (1994).  
2 For a quite exhaustive overview, see Christopher R. Mayes, “Revisiting Foucault’s ‘Normative Confusions’: 
Surveying the Debate Since the Collège de France Lectures,” Philosophy Compass 10:12 (2015), 841–855. 
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Enlightenment. That is reflected by Foucault’s experimental and militant life on the one 
hand, and, on the other, by the neutralization of the epistemological framework of hu-
manism, which is accomplished through his renewed formulation of the concepts of 
power, knowledge, and the subject. Finally, section 4 will conclude by pointing out three 
limitations marking Foucault’s normative strategy. 
1. SETTING UP THE PROBLEM OF NORMATIVITY 
 
In a 1985 contribution to the Foucault/Habermas debate, Nancy Fraser formulates a very 
sophisticated critique of Foucault which casts doubt on the normative validity of his ge-
nealogical method. To begin with, Fraser analyses the accusations Habermas moves 
against Foucault. In The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, Habermas argues that Fou-
cault’s genealogical critique of modernity is premised upon a cryptic normative bias, for 
which he cannot give any compelling justification due to his functional reduction of va-
lidity claims to effects of power.3 Consequently, on Habermas’ view, Foucault is guilty of 
performative contradiction: by discarding the values of truth, rationality, and autonomy 
implicit in his unacknowledged commitment to “a picture of undamaged intersubjectiv-
ity”4, Foucault undercuts the very normative grounds of his own critique and ends up 
advocating a radical and total break with Enlightenment modernity. As Fraser correctly 
notes, Habermas’ reading is not only misguided in important respects.5 His interpretation 
also misses the real target of Foucault’s critique. Contrary to what Habermas maintains, 
Foucault’s genealogy amounts to a rejection not of the Enlightenment but, rather, of hu-
manism. Indeed, for Foucault, Enlightenment modernity and humanism stand “in a state 
of tension rather than identity”.6 However, instead of explaining on what grounds he re-
jects humanism, Fraser claims that Foucault conflates three different arguments against 
humanism: a conceptual, a strategic, and a normative one. For my purposes here, I shall 
focus on the last one, which considers humanism to be intrinsically undesirable. In order 
to support her reading, Fraser invites us to consider the following hypothesis: 
Imagine a perfected disciplinary society in which normalizing power has become so 
omnipresent, […] so […] interiorized, […] that […] hierarchical, asymmetrical domina-
tion of some persons by others would have become superfluous. The members of this 
society would […] be autonomous. [...] But, it is claimed, this would not be freedom.7 
 
3 Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, trans. Frederick Lawrence (1987), 275–276. 
4 Ibid., 337. 
5 Foucault denies that “games of truth are just concealed power relations”. Rather, his problem has always 
been to understand “how truth games are set up and how they are connected with power relations”, see 
Michel Foucault, “The Ethics of the Concern for Self as a Practice of Freedom,” in Ethics, Subjectivity, and 
Truth: Essential Works of Foucault, Volume 1, ed. Paul Rabinow, trans. Robert Hurley et al. (1997), 296. 
6 Ibid., 314. 
7 Nancy Fraser, “Michel Foucault: A ‘Young Conservative’?,” in Critique and Power: Recasting the Foucault/Ha-
bermas Debate, ed. Michael Kelly (1994), 202–203. 
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What this picture of total panopticism hints at is a surreptitious connivance of humanism 
with disciplinary power, whereby the appeal to the humanist ideals of autonomy and 
reciprocity marking Habermas’ theory would sanction his inability to shatter the domi-
nance of its regime. Still, for Fraser, there is a promising move a Habermasian humanist 
could make in order to reply to this criticism. A Habermasian humanist could simply say 
“‘if that’s discipline, I am for it’”, because “there is no good reason to oppose such a soci-
ety”. The latter appears to be unacceptable because Foucault portrays it as “the outcome 
of a historical process of hierarchical, asymmetrical coercion wherein people have been 
[…] ‘bred’ to autonomy”.8 But, as Fraser continues, Foucault’s argument invites genetic 
fallacy, since it draws normatively ambitious conclusions from empirically descriptive in-
sights into our own history, thus generating what she elsewhere calls “normative confu-
sions”.9 In order to remedy these confusions, Foucault should have provided us with “a 
new paradigm of freedom”10 separate from the vocabulary of humanism, which would 
have enabled him to clarify what is obnoxious in a fully panopticized society. Since in her 
view that is not the case, Fraser concludes that Foucault’s normative rejection of human-
ism is unwarranted.11 To put it briefly, being unable to account for the shift from his sus-
pension of the liberal question of the legitimacy of modern power to his call for resistance 
against biopower, Foucault’s work lacks “an adequate normative perspective”12, a defect 
that stands in contrast with the richness of his analyses of power in modern society. Now, 
is there a way to reply to this allegation? A distinctive strategy of response consists in 
defending an interpretation of Foucault as a non-normative thinker. Below, I shall exam-
ine two versions of such a reading and clarify the reasons why their explanations remain 
unconvincing.    
The first version can be found in Koopman’s book Genealogy as Critique.13 Contra Fraser, 
Koopman claims that Foucault’s genealogy is meant not to make definitive judgments 
 
8 Ibid., 203–204. 
9 Nancy Fraser, “Foucault on Modern Power: Empirical Insights and Normative Confusions,” in Unruly Prac-
tices: Power, Discourse and Gender in Contemporary Social Theory (1989). 
10 Fraser, “Michel Foucault: A ‘Young Conservative’?,” 205. 
11 Fraser draws similar conclusions in her 1983 article entitled “Foucault’s Body Language: A Posthumanist 
Political Rhetoric”. The polemical target of this essay is the new vocabulary for social criticism Foucault hints 
at by the reference he makes to the emancipatory force of “bodies and pleasures” in the first volume of The 
History of Sexuality. For Fraser, such a new language is meant to replace the humanist paradigm as the nor-
mative basis of Foucault’s critique of the techniques of domination marking our modern social world. How-
ever, Foucault’s language of “bodies and pleasures” presents the same shortcomings he detects in the hu-
manist rhetoric: indeed, “it seems to involve a retreat from antifoundationalism and a turn to a new meta-
physics – one of bodies – and it may be no less subject to co-optation and mystification than Foucault claims 
humanist critique has been”, Nancy Fraser, “Foucault’s Body Language: A Posthumanist Political Rhetoric,” 
in Unruly Practices: Power, Discourse and Gender in Contemporary Social Theory (1989), 59. According to Fraser, 
therefore, Foucault’s repudiation of humanism remains questionable and largely unpersuasive. Given the 
intricacy of Foucault’s idea of the body, an adequate examination of Fraser’s uncharitable reading would 
demand much more space than I have at my disposal here. Consequently, I shall leave it aside and keep on 
focalizing my attention on Fraser’s 1985 essay, whose discussion of the problematic of freedom in Foucault’s 
work is also more germane to my overall purposes.  
12 Fraser, “Foucault on Modern Power”, 33.  
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about the wrongness of our practices and forms of self-constitution, but rather to expose 
their dangerous nature through a critical problematization of the power-laden processes 
that have enabled their emergence. As a result, for Koopman, Fraser’s argument is mis-
leading: Foucault’s genealogy is not fallacious because it does not amount to the robust 
kind of genetic reasoning she attacks. Such an interpretation does not lack textual support. 
Most notably, expressing his view on Nietzsche’s propensity to conflate genesis and va-
lidity, in a later interview Foucault states: “I think there is no relation between genesis and 
validity”.14 Yet, it is my contention that Koopman overstretches Foucault’s position. Alt-
hough he thinks it can be integrated with the resources for normative reconstruction pro-
vided by Habermas and pragmatism, Koopman indeed maintains that Foucault’ geneal-
ogy would offer a description of the problematizations at the basis of the historical ap-
pearance of certain practices fraught with dangers “without making any normative claims 
about these practices”.15 Now, the strict line of demarcation Koopman draws between 
Foucault’s genealogical approach and normativity seems hardly tenable. To show why 
this is the case, I shall start by considering the following passage:  
I would like to do the genealogy of problems, of problématiques. My point is not that 
everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same as 
bad. If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. So my position 
leads not to apathy but to a hyper- and pessimistic activism. I think that the ethico-po-
litical choice we have to make every day is to determine which is the main danger. Take 
as an example Robert Castel’s analysis of the history of the antipsychiatry movement 
[La Gestion des risques]. I agree completely with what Castel says, but that does not mean, 
as some people suppose, that the mental hospitals were better than antipsychiatry; that 
does not mean that we were not right to criticize those mental hospitals. I think it was good 
to do that, because they were the danger. And now it’s quite clear that the danger has 
changed.16 
On my view, what Foucault means here is that the genealogical examination of how a set 
of given practices “could […] be valid, at a certain moment, in a certain context”17 does 
involve a kind of normative evaluation, which he articulates in terms of the dangerous-
ness derived from the structural circularity between validity and relations of power.  
There are at least two reasons for favouring this line of argument: first, it coheres well 
with the rhetorical inflection of Foucault’s work as well as with the political and 
 
13 Colin Koopman, Genealogy as Critique. Foucault and the Problems of Modernity (2013), 88–90. 
14 Michel Foucault, “Ethics and Politics,” unedited and unpublished full interview with Paul Rabinow, Rich-
ard Rorty, Martin Jay, Leo Löwenthal, and Charles Taylor held at the University of California at Berkeley in 
April 1983. For a complete transcription, see Michel Foucault, “Discussion with Michel Foucault”, in 
IMEC/Fonds Michel Foucault, D 250(8). Excerpts of this interview were later published in Michel Foucault, 
“Politics and Ethics: An Interview,” in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (1984). 
15 Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 92, emphasis added. 
16 Michel Foucault, “On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress,” in Ethics, Subjectivity, 
and Truth: Essential Works of Foucault, Volume 1, ed. Paul Rabinow, trans. Robert Hurley et al. (1997), 256, 
emphasis added. 
17 Foucault, “Ethics and Politics”. 
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epistemological primacy he allocates to resistance in his analysis of modern power.18 In a 
1978 interview, for instance, Foucault describes his project as being aimed at “deciphering 
a layer of reality in such a way that […] the lines of fragility come forth; […]. It is a reality 
of possible struggles that I wish to bring to light”.19 Secondly, whereas I agree with 
Koopman that Foucault’s “distinction between problematic indeterminacy and determi-
nate wrongness”20 enables him to avoid the dead end of moralism, I shall insist that “the 
very notion of danger is itself value-laden”.21 As the passage above suggests, what moti-
vates Foucault’s genealogical investigations of the dangers embedded in certain historical 
practices is the attempt to illuminate their bad uses and their adverse implications for our 
contemporary life. Moreover, even if it were abnormative, the category of dangerousness 
seems to involve not only a normative call for attention, but also a recommendation for 
some kind of reflexive intervention, as attested by Foucault’s allusion to his own hyper- 
and pessimistic activism. Consequently, pace Koopman, speaking about dangers does not 
relieve one of addressing the problem of normativity. Rather, it leaves us with a pressing 
series of questions: why is power “dangerous’? For whom? And what is the normative 
orientation enabling Foucault’s own talk about dangers? 
As mentioned above, however, Koopman is not the sole scholar to divorce Foucault’s 
genealogical method from normativity. Mark Kelly has recently argued that what distin-
guishes Foucault’s work is his rejection of any normative vision that would prescribe what 
and how one should think and act. In this respect, for Kelly, Foucault endorses a non-
normative modality of critique that is both “atheoretical” and unpolitical: not only does 
he abstain from totalizing and systematic theorizing, but he also discards politics in the 
form of “‘party’s politics’ and statecraft”. Foucault, therefore, would engage in a type of 
critique whose role is “simply to analyse things in order to undermine them”.22 Notwith-
standing the inconclusive reasons he provides to defend the preferability of this approach 
over normative political theory23, here I would like to call into question the non-normative 
reading of Foucault’s thought Kelly proposes. To begin with, whereas Kelly maintains 
that Foucault’s analyses are purely descriptive and his vocabulary is neutral, one can find 
several passages where Foucault makes explicit his valorisation of difference and eman-
cipatory transformation, like the following one:  
 
18 See Michel Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” in Power: Essential Works of Foucault, Volume 3, ed. James D. 
Faubion, trans. Robert Hurley et al. (2000), 329. See also Michel Foucault, “The Analytic Philosophy of Poli-
tics,” trans. Giovanni Maria Mascaretti, Foucault Studies 24 (2018), 192. 
19 Michel Foucault, “Clarifications on the Question of Power,” in Foucault Live: Collected Interviews, 1966–1984, 
ed. Sylvère Lotringer (1996), 261. 
20 Colin Koopman, “Genealogy, Methodology, & Normativity beyond Transcendentality: Replies to Amy 
Allen, Eduardo Mendieta, & Kevin Olson,” Foucault Studies 18 (2014), 269. 
21 Richard J. Bernstein, “Foucault: Critique as Philosophical Ethos,” in Critique and Power: Recasting the Fou-
cault/Habermas Debate, ed. Michael Kelly (1994), 227. 
22 Mark G. E. Kelly, For Foucault: Against Normative Political Theory (2018), 9–11. 
23 For an illuminating piece, see Frieder Vogelmann’s review of For Foucault: Against Normative Political The-
ory, by Mark G. E. Kelly, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. An Electronic Journal, 2018 (accessed October 5, 
2018). 
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We must fight against the impoverishment of the relational fabric. We must secure recog-
nition for relations of provisional coexistence, adoption...24 
The normative connotation of similar passages seems unmistakable. Nevertheless, Kelly 
can rebut that “there is no need to assert normatively that we should be on the side of 
resistance, since […] we are essentially resistant entities”, whose “nature is precisely to 
defy any attempt to ascribe to us any specific natural qualities”.25 What I take Kelly to 
mean is that the difference Foucault’s draws between resistance and power does not rest 
upon universal standards for judgment, according to which resistance and power would 
stand for the good and bad respectively. After all, resistance and power are normatively 
ambivalent phenomena, where resistance should be construed just as “counter-power”. 
Rather, what demarcates resistance from power is that resistance does not call for the ar-
ticulation of any norm. As Kelly puts it, “social movements do require norms […] to the 
extent that they have power relations within them, and are not purely resistant”.26 Now, 
what is the rationale behind this normative division? Kelly’s answer heavily relies on Pat-
ton’s account of Foucault’s subject of power. According to the latter, “resistance is an ef-
fect of human freedom”, whereby “in the attempt to exercise their capacity for autono-
mous action, those subject to relations of domination will inevitably be led to oppose 
them”.27 On Patton’s view, then, resistance would be guaranteed by our force as living 
entities, namely as conscious and self-conscious agents endowed with the power (in the 
Latin sense of the word “potere”) to freely act otherwise when power is exerted over us in 
the form of domination.  
As Schubert clarifies, however, Patton’s interpretation amounts to an “ontological 
shortcut”28, which assumes that the general and minimal definition of human beings’ free 
capacity for action can “automatically” solve, as it were, the socio-theoretically complex 
and specific problem of the historical emergence of freedom as critical resistance against 
the modern regimes of subjec(tiva)tion. To the contrary, Patton’s socio-ontological ac-
count of human agency can only demonstrate the possibility of resistance in light of the 
essential freedom of individual agents to act otherwise within the strategic field of the 
existing governmental technologies of power29, while it fails to explain how such freedom 
translates into actual and singular practices of resistance geared to transform the domi-
nant modes of social identification. To state it briefly, pace Kelly, we are essentially free 
in a minimal sense, but not essentially resistive. Rather, the actualization of resistance de-
pends upon a certain “decision-making will not to be governed”30 like that and at such a 
 
24 Michel Foucault, “The Social Triumph of the Sexual Will,” in Ethics, Subjectivity, and Truth: Essential Works 
of Foucault, Volume 1, ed. Paul Rabinow, trans. Robert Hurley et al. (1997), 158, translation amended, emphasis 
added. 
25 Kelly, For Foucault, 154. 
26 Ibid., 124. 
27 Paul Patton, “Foucault’s Subject of Power,” Political Theory Newsletter 11 (1994), 69. 
28 Karsten Schubert, Freiheit als Kritik. Sozialphilosophie nach Foucault (2018), 59. 
29 Ibid., 151. 
30 Michel Foucault, “What is Critique?,” in The Politics of Truth, ed. S. Lotringer, trans. L. Hochroth and C. 
Porter (2007), 74. 
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price, which Foucault places at the root of the critical attitude questioning the modern arts 
of government. But doesn’t the concept of a decision-making will entail a reference to the 
normative interests behind such a choice? And doesn’t the specification “at such a price” 
hint at the “deep malaise”31 produced by abusive techniques of government that can no 
longer be accepted? The normative implications of these questions go missing in Kelly’s 
reading. Assuming the equivalence between normativity and prescription as the unques-
tioned premise of his argument, in fact, Kelly insists on claiming that the basis of Fou-
cault’s opposition to power is not the commitment to some normative values. Foucault’s 
critique, instead, should be better understood as a descriptive analysis aimed at unveiling 
the “hypocrisy” of power, namely how power has to substantially conceal itself in order 
to be “tolerable”.32 And yet, why is power intolerable? Isn’t intolerability a normative fea-
ture of the existing predicament? As I shall show below, Foucault’s characterization of 
power relations as “intolerable” straightforwardly points to the normative dimension of 
his work. Beforehand, however, it is necessary to illustrate the largely implicit model of 
critical reflection underlying Foucault’s philosophical project.  
2. AGAINST THE MODERN REGIME OF TRUTH:  
CRITIQUE AS EMANCIPATORY PRACTICE 
 
To this end, allow me to briefly return to Habermas’ reading of Foucault. As Habermas 
elaborates his critique, one can easily note that the latter is formulated on the basis of a 
skewed playing field. Tacitly relying on an exclusive description of critique as a measur-
ing activity, Habermas condemns Foucault’s genealogy for failing to meet the require-
ment of providing a rational justification of his claims grounded in universal and objective 
arguments. What Habermas’ polemic overlooks, though, is that Foucault’s genealogy 
amounts to a different practice of critique which refuses the kind of foundation Habermas 
demands. Indeed, by submitting the imperatives of modern rationalization to the judge-
ment of the regulative ideal of an uncontaminated form of communicative reason founded 
on the universal rules of rational argumentation, for Foucault Habermas gets caught in 
“the blackmail of being either for or against the Enlightenment”.33 As a result, Habermas 
is led to denounce as irrationalist all those who dispute the allegedly universal and abso-
lute force of its values. On the contrary, against this blackmail, Foucault believes that the 
essential task of critical thought is not to put reason on trial, but rather to investigate rea-
son’s historical effects and limits, as well as its intrinsic dangers.34  
In this sense, Foucault undertakes an analysis of how “focal points of experience” – i.e., 
constructed realities like madness, crime, and sexuality – have emerged out of an intricate 
 
31 Michel Foucault, “Interview with Michel Foucault,” in Power: Essential Works of Foucault, Volume 3, ed. 
James D. Faubion, trans. Robert Hurley et al. (2000), 283. 
32 Kelly, For Foucault, 149. 
33 Michel Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?,” in Ethics, Subjectivity, and Truth: Essential Works of Foucault, 
Volume 1, ed. Paul Rabinow, trans. Robert Hurley et al. (1997), 314. 
34 See Michel Foucault, “Space, Knowledge, and Power,” in Power: Essential Works of Foucault, Volume 3, ed. 
James D. Faubion, trans. Robert Hurley et al. (2000), 358. 
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set of discursive and non-discursive practices guided by historically specific rationalities, 
whose articulation results from the intersection between systems of knowledge, govern-
mental strategies of power, and modes of subjectivation.35 More precisely, following his 
later retrospective accounts of his philosophical itinerary, the goal of Foucault’s archaeo-
genealogical inquiries is to disclose the historical processes of problematization organiz-
ing the “conditions of acceptability”36 of the current system of practices. Such a task entails 
the clarification of the entanglements between knowledge [savoir] and power [pouvoir] at 
the basis of their historical appearance, as well the forms of subjectivity they enable. In 
the first place, therefore, one can describe Foucault’s project as a history of problematiza-
tions geared to explain how the current regime of practices has developed from a complex 
series of historical transformations in “‘the ensemble of rules according to which the true 
and the false are separated and specific effects of power are attached to the true’”. As their 
contingent responses, the forms of rationality these problematizations make possible are 
nothing other than different ways of articulating the relationship between men’s govern-
ment of themselves and others on the one hand and, on the other, the production of dis-
courses that society “accepts and makes function as true”.37 Yet, Foucault does not present 
his enterprise solely in terms of a history of problematizations. He further qualifies it as 
being meant to “dissipate what is familiar and accepted, to re-examine rules and institu-
tions and on the basis of this reproblematization [...] to participate in the formation of a 
political will”.38 Consequently, through the archaeo-genealogical contestation of the inev-
itability and naturalness of our dangerously ossified practices, Foucault seeks not only to 
unmask the historical problematizations at the basis of their emergence in order to open 
them up to radically alternative responses; Foucault also strives to rethink “from the root 
the way men problematize their behaviour”39, so as to challenge the limits within which 
these problematizations confine our experiences. 
Now, for Foucault, the success of this critical practice depends upon its ability to eman-
cipate its addressees from the “regime of truth” moulding the uncontested horizon of their 
experiences. By the notion of “regime of truth”, Foucault refers to the relationship of co-
implication between the governmental technologies of modern biopolitics and the dis-
courses of truth proper to human sciences, which determines the subjecting production 
of modern individuals as being marked by a two-faced identity: their identity as empiri-
cal, biosocial objects and their identity as autonomous, authentic selves. Whereas in 1976 
Foucault still thinks that critique implies “detaching the power of truth from the forms of 
 
35 See Michel Foucault, The Government of Self and Others. Lectures at the Collège de France 1982–83, ed. Arnold 
I. Davidson, Frédéric Gros, François Ewald, and Alessandro Fontana, trans. Graham Burchell (2010), 2–3. 
36 Foucault, “What is Critique?”, 62. 
37 Michel Foucault, “Truth and Power,” in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews & Other Writings 1972–77, ed. 
Colin Gordon, trans. Colin Gordon et al. (1980), 131–132. 
38 Michel Foucault, “The Concern for Truth,” in Politics, Philosophy, and Culture. Interviews and Other Writings 
1977–84, ed. Lawrence D. Kritzman, trans. Alan Sheridan et al. (1988), 256, emphasis added. 
39 Michel Foucault, “À propos de la généalogie de l’éthique: un aperçu du travail en cours,” in Dits et Écrits 
II, 1976–88, ed. Daniel Defert, François Ewald, and Jacques Lagrange (2001), 1431, my translation. 
Foucault, Normativity, and Freedom 
Foucault Studies, No. 27, 23-46.  32  
hegemony, social, economic and cultural, within which it operates at the present time”40, 
in The Birth of Biopolitics Foucault modifies his description of the role of critique. Taking 
the cue from his account of liberalism as an art of government whose practices are orga-
nized around a partage between the true and the false indexed to market economy, here 
Foucault reinterprets his previous work as a “genealogy of regimes of veridiction”, i.e., as 
the historical analysis of the constitution of realities like madness, crime, and sexuality in 
light of the coordination of series of practices with a certain regime of truth. Foucault can 
thus maintain that the political role of critique lies in its capacity to determine “under 
what conditions and with what effects a veridiction is exercised”. This means that the 
primary target is not so much the mechanisms of power responsible for the production of 
truth, as is still the case in 1976, but rather the very “rules of verification and falsification” 
that inform our practices.41  
Still, how can critique deliver its addressees from the operations of truth that entrench 
the dominant forms of subjec(tiva)tion? Clearly enough, critique cannot be limited to an 
activity aimed at falsifying what is accepted as true, since that would leave untouched the 
system of rules for the division between the true and the false structuring our schemes of 
intelligibility. On Foucault’s view, instead, the point of critique is to short-circuit the re-
gime of truth and error “through which being is historically constituted as experience”.42 
To this end, Foucault engages in the construction of historical “fictions”, i.e., counter-his-
tories that call into question the ruling nexus of power-knowledge not “by playing a game 
[…] totally different from the [existing] game of truth, but by playing the same game dif-
ferently”.43 Neither true nor false with respect to the prevalent truth-regime, fictions ena-
ble Foucault to elaborate transfigurative interpretations of the historical reality, which 
serve two interrelated functions: on the one hand, they make visible the power-laden con-
ditions at the root of our supposedly universal and necessary truths, thereby producing a 
change in people’s “forms of sensibility and thresholds of tolerance” that detaches them 
from current dispositifs of power-knowledge.44 On the other, fictions also represent invita-
tions for both the author and his addressees to intervene in the lines of rupture they 
 
40 Foucault, “Truth and Power”, 133.  
41 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics. Lectures at the Collège de France (1978–79), ed. Arnold I. Davidson, 
Michel Senellart, François Ewald, and Alessandro Fontana, trans. Graham Burchell (2008), 35–36. Admit-
tedly, a comprehensive discussion of Foucault’s notion of regime of truth would require including here the 
analysis of the outline of a political history of truth Foucault sketches in his 1979–80 lectures at the Collège 
the France On the Government of the Living. For some insightful comments, see Daniele Lorenzini, Le force du 
vrai. De Foucault à Austin (2017). My decision to omit it is deliberate, being motivated by the limited space 
available. Moreover, whereas its reformulation in On the Government of the Living hinges on the dimension of 
subjectivity (see Michel Foucault, On the Government of the Living Lectures at the Collège de France (1979–80), 
ed. Arnold I. Davidson, Michel Senellart, François Ewald, and Alessandro Fontana, trans. Graham Burchell 
(2014), 49–50), Foucault’s definition of the notion of regime of truth in The Birth of Biopolitics is focused on the 
element of truth, which makes it more congenial to the argument I intend to elaborate in this section. 
42 Michel Foucault, The Use of Pleasure. Volume 2 of The History of Sexuality, trans. Robert Hurley (1990), 6–7. 
43 Foucault, “The Ethics of the Concern for Self as a Practice of Freedom”, 295. 
44 Michel Foucault, “Questions of Method,” in Power: Essential Works of Foucault, Volume 3, ed. James D. 
Faubion, trans. Robert Hurley et al. (New York: New Press, 2000), 234. 
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unravel and experiment with alternative possibilities of relating to themselves and con-
temporary experience.45 Re-examining The Will to Knowledge in view of these methodolog-
ical remarks, for example, Foucault’s diagnosis of biopower fabricates a counter-history 
that disrupts our adherence to the sovereign-based, juridico-repressive conception of 
power marking the discourse of humanism. By pointing out the connection of our will to 
sexual truth with a global and productive strategy of power aimed at governing individ-
uals and populations alike, Foucault shows that the stake of a politics of resistance is not 
the desire to liberate our authentic sexual identity (itself allied with the mechanisms of 
normalization), but rather the invention of a different political “economy of bodies and 
pleasures”46 as a corrective against the sex-desire couple at the basis of the truth-regime 
of the modern dispositif of sexuality. In sum, Foucault’s genealogy describes a problema-
tizing mode of critical inquiry designed to free us from what Owen calls our regime of 
“aspectival captivity”47, i.e., from the exclusive, self-imposed order of truths shaping the 
seemingly unsurpassable limits of our thought, practices, and forms of subjectivity. 
If that is true, however, from a Habermasian perspective one could object that without 
a neat separation between power and validity any talk about freedom is meaningless. As 
other prominent critics like Taylor, Rorty, and Walzer argue, in fact, freedom can be con-
ceived only in two ways: either as liberation from power altogether, or as voluntary sub-
jection to a form of power whose legitimate authority has been agreed upon without any 
power constraint intervening into the process.48 In this respect, since Foucault qualifies 
the emancipatory force of liberation by showing its tactical usage within wider power 
strategies, any reference to freedom in his work should be read at best as a revision of his 
earlier anti-humanist stance or, at worst, as the expression of an incoherent attitude verg-
ing on a form of anarchism and “aesthetic decisionism”.49 Yet, these readings neglect one 
of Foucault’s major innovations, which is to say his rejection of the idea that freedom and 
power stand in a relation of mutual exclusion. As his late reformulation of power as 
 
45 See Foucault, “Interview with Foucault”, 243. 
46 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction (The Will to Knowledge), trans. Robert 
Hurley (1978), 159. 
47 See David Owen, “Criticism and Captivity: On Genealogy and Critical Theory,” European Journal of Philos-
ophy 10:2 (2002). 
48 See Charles Taylor, “Foucault on Freedom and Truth,” in Foucault: A Critical Reader, ed. David C. Hoy 
(1986); Richard Rorty, “Moral Identity and Private Autonomy,” in Michel Foucault Philosopher, ed. François 
Ewald, trans. Timothy J. Armstrong (1992); Michael Walzer, “The Politics of Michel Foucault,” in Foucault: A 
Critical Reader, ed. David C. Hoy, (1986). 
49 Walzer “The Politics of Michel Foucault,” 53. Admittedly, Rorty proposes a subtler version of this criticism, 
whereby Foucault would be guilty of conflating two roles: on the one hand, as a public intellectual, he was 
a “humanitarian bourgeois liberal”. On the other, as a private citizen, he was also “a knight of autonomy” 
strenuously engaged in practices of self-transformation. For Rorty, this conflation has led him to endorse a 
quasi-anarchic stance marked by the dangerous transposition of his quest for autonomy at the social level. 
Suggesting a depoliticized reading of his notion of freedom, then, Rorty concludes that Foucault should have 
kept the two roles separate by limiting autonomy within the realm of negative liberty ensured by the liberal 
state, whose goal is “not to invent or create anything, but simply to make it as easy as possible for people to 
achieve their widely different private ends without hurting each other” (Rorty, “Moral Identity and Private 
Autonomy”, 330–331). 
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government makes clear, in fact, Foucault thinks that as a mode of action structuring “the 
possible field of action of others”, power finds the condition of its exercise in human sub-
jects’ freedom to conduct themselves in several ways. The latter include accepting to be 
obedient and governable subjects, but also giving form to “the intransigence of freedom” 
by withdrawing their consent to submit to the predominant mechanisms of power.50 Ac-
cordingly, pointing to the existence of alternative possibilities of freedom immanent in the 
existing regime of power, Foucault implicitly criticizes Habermas for failing to note that   
the problem [...] is not to try to dissolve them [i.e., power relations] in the utopia of 
completely transparent communication but to acquire the rules of law, the management 
techniques, and also the ethics [...] that will allow us to play these games of power with 
as little domination as possible.51 
The importance of this passage for the economy of my argument can be hardly overesti-
mated: indeed, as I shall show in the next section, here Foucault indirectly identifies in the 
struggle for freedom as self-transformation the evaluative perspective marking his critical 
philosophy, whose standpoint provides the normative reasons that Fraser thinks Foucault 
fails to supply in order to account for his rejection of humanism. 
3. ENLIGHTENMENT, SELF-TRANSFORMATIVE FREEDOM AND 
EXEMPLARITY 
 
As we have just seen, Foucault’s later reformulation of power as government is premised 
upon a conception of human subjects as free agents who have the capacity to shape the 
thought and actions of others as well as their own.52 This new paradigm of power as gov-
ernment persuades Foucault of the necessity to distinguish between three levels in the 
analytics of power: power, domination, and governmental technologies.53 Though the 
point is well-known, allow me to recall it for the sake of clarity: (1) power describes a 
mobile and reversible set of strategic relations between liberties co-extensive with the en-
tire social body, in which one tries to orchestrate the space of possible action of others. (2) 
These relations are opposed to states of domination, in which a person or a group has 
been able to crystallize strategic relations into hardly reversible, fixed, and asymmetrical 
structures of power, thereby reducing the exercise of and opportunity for freedom to its 
smallest margin. (3) Finally, one must also distinguish the intermediate level of govern-
mental technologies, namely of all those systematized forms of power resulting from the 
dangerous tendency of strategic relations to coagulate into stable configurations, which 
 
50 Michel Foucault, “The Subject and Power”, 341–342. 
51 Foucault, “The Ethics of the Concern for Self as a Practice of Freedom”, 298. 
52 Foucault, “The Subject and Power”, 340. As Patton has compellingly showed, Foucault’s late distinction 
between power as a relational structure (power over) and power as potere (power to) is already at work in 
his earlier genealogical work. Here, though, the terms Foucault employs are different: “power” stands for 
“power over”, while “force” replaces “power to”. See Paul Patton, “Taylor and Foucault on Power and Free-
dom,” Political Studies 37 (1989). 
53 Foucault, “The Ethics of the Concern for Self as a Practice of Freedom”, 299. 
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in turn might engender states of domination. Contrary to what is often assumed, however, 
for Foucault states of domination are an exceptional, extreme case in power relations.54 
That is the reason why Foucault prefers to concentrate his attention on governmental tech-
nologies as those systems of power within which individuals’ submission to the obliga-
tions associated with the dominant regime of truth produces a form of aspectival captivity 
undermining their capacity to recognize themselves as (un)free agents. As a result, critics 
are mistaken when they claim that Foucault does not give us normative resources to es-
tablish why power ought to be resisted: insofar as he is able to explain how we have be-
come enthralled by the truths that adjust our processes of self-constitution to the identifi-
catory ambitions of the current mechanisms of governmental power, Foucault shows that 
we are ethically and politically motivated to revolt against the power relations shoring up 
our regime of aspectival captivity:  
The most important question […] is not whether a culture without restraints is possible 
or even desirable but whether the system of constraints in which a society functions 
leaves individuals the liberty to transform the system. [...] a system of constraint becomes 
truly intolerable when the individuals who are affected by it don’t have the means of 
modifying it.55 
In this sense, by showing the historical contingency of our sedimented practices and the 
possibility that they could be something different, Foucault seeks to provide us with al-
ternative modes of understanding our experience. These enable us to acknowledge the 
normative salience not only of questioning the historical problematizations at the root of 
the practices constitutive of our present, but also of engaging in the hazardous work of 
experimentally tailoring self-transformative answers to these very same problematiza-
tions. Put briefly, as a partisan practice of inquiry, the goal of Foucault’s archaeo-genea-
logical critique is to “give new impetus […] to the undefined work of freedom”56, facili-
tating our involvement in games of power with a minimum of domination. Indeed, as 
Foucault claims,  
it is here that we will find the real possibility of constructing a history of what we have 
done and, at the same time, a diagnosis of what we are. [...] this theoretical analysis 
would have a political dimension [...] that relates to what we are willing to accept in our 
world – to accept, to refuse, and to change, both in ourselves and in our circumstances. 
In sum, it is a question of searching for a new kind of critical philosophy. Not a critical 
philosophy that seeks to determine the conditions and the limits of our possible 
 
54 As Foucault himself states, “power relations are extremely widespread in human relationships” but one 
“sometimes encounters […] situations or states of domination” (Ibid., 283, emphasis added). 
55 Foucault adds: “This can happen when such a system becomes intangible as a result of its being considered 
a moral or religious imperative, or a necessary consequence of medical science”, Michel Foucault, “Sexual 
Choice, Sexual Act,” in Ethics, Subjectivity, and Truth: Essential Works of Foucault, Volume 1, ed. Paul Rabinow, 
trans. Robert Hurley et al. (1997), 147–148, emphasis added. 
56 Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?,” 316. 
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knowledge of the object, but a critical philosophy that seeks the conditions and the in-
definite possibilities of transforming the subject, of transforming ourselves.57 
At this stage, we are in a good position to comprehend why, from a Foucauldian perspec-
tive, the fully panopticized society Fraser depicts should be contested. Although it de-
scribes a state of structural autonomy, in Foucault’s view the governmental mechanisms 
of disciplinary power marking this hypothetical society would produce a barely visible 
and alterable state of domination58, which should be rejected because it would entrench 
the condition of aspectival captivity associated with the modern regime of truth, thereby 
blocking the more dynamic realization of freedom as self-transformation. Indeed, a 
wholly panopticized society would dangerously present the rationality of humanism as a 
“universal model [valid] for any kind of freedom”.59 A wholly panopticized society would 
thus restrict freedom within the frontiers that define the horizon of possibilities for 
thought and action associated with the commitment to our identification as autonomous 
and authentic selves as well as the correlative preservation of the democratic order 
through the ever-refined mechanisms of biopower. As I have clarified above, instead, the 
point of Foucault’s inquiries is precisely to disclose the historical contingency of the limits 
our humanist truths impose upon our experience as free subjects. More precisely, Fou-
cault encourages us to fashion self-transformative responses to the historical problematics 
we face, which are meant to broaden our sense of the possible and create a “new economy 
of power”.60 In this respect, as the normative basis of his account of modern dangers, Fou-
cault’s conception of freedom as self-transformation should be clearly demarcated from 
normative appeals to Kantian autonomy as the power to rationally determine one’s choice 
without interference in the context of a normative framework of pre-established options.61 
If freedom were only so conceived, in fact, one would run the risk of lapsing back into the 
conception of freedom connected to the juridico-repressive model of power, while miss-
ing how modern biopolitics operates by governmentally pre-structuring “possible or ac-
tual future or present actions”62 within a given field of possibilities. Rather, far from being 
 
57 Michel Foucault, “Subjectivity and Truth,” in The Politics of Truth, ed. S. Lotringer, trans. L. Hochroth and 
C. Porter (2007), 152–153. 
58 Admittedly, the governmental technologies of Fraser’s hypothetical society would be so perfected to ob-
viate some of the characteristics Foucault ascribes to states of domination according to his late definition 
reported at the beginning of this section. As Fraser argues, in fact, hierarchical and asymmetrical power 
relations would be dispensable, because “disciplinary norms […] would not be experienced as coming from 
without” (Fraser, “Michel Foucault: A ‘Young Conservative’?”, 203). To reformulate my claim here, however, 
the fully panopticized society Fraser depicts would still present what Foucault considers to be the truly dis-
tinctive feature of states of domination, namely the rigid and scarcely changeable nature of their impercep-
tible system of power.  
59 Foucault, “Truth, Power, Self: An Interview with Michel Foucault,” in Technologies of the Self: A Seminar 
with Michel Foucault, ed. Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman, and Patrick H. Hutton (1988), 15. 
60 Foucault, “The Subject and Power”, 328. 
61 Among others, for a recent interpretation of Foucault as embracing “the Kantian ideal of autonomy as the 
source of value”, see Tuomo Tiisala, “Overcoming ‘the Present Limits of the Necessary’: Foucault’s Concep-
tion of a Critique,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 55, no. S1, Spindel Supplement (2017), 15. 
62 Foucault, “The Subject and Power”, 340.
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reducible to the space of negative liberty promoted by the liberal rationality of govern-
ment, my claim is that Foucault’s concept of freedom should be better understood as a 
practice of self-empowerment involving at one and the same time two different but tightly 
interrelated moves: on the one hand, a subtractive act of “desubjection” [désassujettisse-
ment]63 (Foucault 2007, 47) from the governmental mechanisms of power crafting individ-
uals’ conduct according to the dominant regime of truth. On the other, an ethico-political 
practice of creative stylization marking any concrete engagement in new processes of sub-
jectivation aimed at reshaping the problematizations that condition who we are. As an 
illustration, discussing the gay movement, Foucault asserts:  
It is [...] necessary to struggle to establish homosexual lifestyles, existential choices in 
which sexual relations with people of the same sex will be important. [...] It’s not […] a 
matter of integrating this strange little practice of making love with someone of the same 
sex into pre-existing cultures; it’s a matter of constructing [créer] cultural forms.64 
Since Aristotle, the traditional conception of possibility thinks of the latter as dependent 
on actuality. On the contrary, for Foucault, the issue is to overturn this hierarchical rela-
tion by enabling individuals to devise still unexplored existential possibilities that are re-
ducible neither to mere logical possibilities, nor to the pre-established space of what is 
actually possible according to the governmental and impoverished logic of our modern 
social world. Hence, Foucault’s aim is to foster individuals’ capacity to trigger specific 
changes through the practical invention of “modalities of relationship, modes of existence, 
types of values, forms of exchange between individuals which would be really new”.65 To 
state it otherwise, what Foucault pleads for is not so much the acknowledgement of one’s 
mode of living within the existing social order, but rather a rearrangement of the frame-
work of intelligibility employed to make sense of the actuality and what is possible 
through the introduction of “a whole series of other values and choices for which there 
are not yet real possibilities”.66 Accordingly, Foucault’s model of critique encourages us 
to recognize that, as one of the historically specific forms human freedom can take, the 
humanist value of autonomy has lost much of its normative pull and needs to be replaced 
with an expanded and renewed paradigm of freedom as capacity for self-transformation, 
i.e., to become other than we are. The latter is driven by what Foucault describes as the 
challenge of discovering possible ways of disconnecting “the growth of capabilities [ca-
pacités] […] from the intensification of power relations”.67 On my view, however, it is cru-
cial not to disjoin this open-ended capacity for self-transformation from its practical 
 
63 Foucault, “What is Critique?”, 47. 
64 Foucault, “The Social Triumph of the Sexual Will”, 157. 
65 Ibid., 159–160, translation amended. In this respect, although she misses Foucault’s dual characterization 
of freedom, Han correctly speaks of Foucault’s notion of freedom as “ontologically disclosive power”, see Béa-
trice Han[-Pile], “Nietzsche and Foucault on Style: The Limits of the Aesthetic Paradigm,” in Nietzsche, Post-
modernismus und was nach ihnen kommt, ed. Endre Kiss and Uschi Nussbaumer-Benz (2000), 12. References 
are to manuscript. 
66 Foucault, “The Social Triumph of the Sexual Will”, 157. 
67 Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?”, 317. 
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actualization. In this respect, Allen’s characterization of Foucault’s notion of freedom ex-
clusively as “capacities for critical reflection and self-transformation”68 runs the risk of 
conceptualizing freedom as if it could be assured by specific institutional arrangements. 
Conversely, Foucault insists that freedom “must be exercised” and there is no other guar-
antee of freedom than freedom itself.69 As a result, for Foucault, freedom should be un-
derstood not as submission to the moral law or as a regulative idea like in Kant, but rather 
as the exercise of a historically situated disclosive force that demarcates the limits beyond 
which the subjection to power becomes intolerable. This means that freedom can exist 
only in actu, in the voluntary acts of creative desubjection of particular agents. It is through 
constant innovation alone that we can contrast the danger for freedom of being (re)cap-
tured by new dispositifs of seizure, in the hope that history’s reservoir of possibilities will 
enable us to produce liberating cultural forms out of the materials of our present. That is 
the reason why, for Foucault, archaeology and genealogy remain needed: by reconstruct-
ing the multiple set of historical conditions of possibility at the basis of the modern regime 
of truth, their problematizations induce a discomforting change of perspective that es-
tranges us from our practices and their guiding rationalities “so as to reveal [them] at a 
distance”.70 Such an operation not only facilitates the emergence of the breaking points 
where our forms of intelligibility begin to flake apart, but also brings to light historical 
materials that might be used to foster radical transformations in the present. Indeed, as 
Foucault himself claims in a late interview, 
among the cultural inventions of mankind there is a treasury of devices, techniques, 
ideas, procedures, and so on, that cannot exactly be reactivated but at least constitute 
[…] a certain point of view which can be very useful as a tool for analysing what’s going 
on now – and to change it.71 
According to such a perspective, pace its consensus-oriented detractors (and in particular 
Rorty), Foucault’s immanent practice of critical self-reflection does not appeal to a prelim-
inary assumption about the identity of the “we” involved in the normative question “what 
are we to do?”, whose coordinates would define the conditions of legitimacy for criticism. 
Rather, Foucault rejects any supposedly authentic truth about who we are in order to clear 
 
68 Amy Allen, The Politics of Our Selves. Power, Autonomy, and Gender in Contemporary Critical Theory (2008), 2. 
Contrastively, for an outright rejection of this reading in terms of “capacities”, see Johanna Oksala, Foucault 
on Freedom (2005), 188.  
69 Foucault, “Space, Knowledge, and Power”, 354–355. In addition, Koopman highlights that theorizing free-
dom only in terms of “capacity” invites to think of it as being possessed by a transcendental subject of the 
kind Foucault strove to discard (see Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 208). For a Deleuzian reading of Fou-
cault’s conception of freedom erroneously based on the non-enunciable and aprioristic metaphysical cate-
gory of “the outside”, which Foucault already criticizes in the Archaeology of Knowledge, see Sergei Prozorov, 
Foucault, Freedom and Sovereignty (2007). 
70 Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” in Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology: Essential Works 
of Foucault, Volume 2, ed. James D. Faubion, trans. R. Hurley et al. (1998), 382, translation amended. 
71 Foucault, “On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress”, 261. 
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up the space for the creation of a “we” in the future.72 The normative success of Foucault’s 
philosophical enterprise, therefore, depends upon its fallible and modest contribution to 
the formation of a “community of action” engaged in the “historico-practical test” [mise à 
l’épreuve] of the alternative possibilities for emancipation disclosed by his archaeo-genea-
logical investigations.73 
This means that Foucault’s critical practice does not consist in legislating what justice 
is on behalf of the oppressed, but rather in promoting their struggle through the contes-
tation of the historical limits constraining the forms of freedom within the social order 
generated by the synergic confluence of the modern techniques of biopolitical govern-
ment with the conceptual apparatus of humanism.74 However, contrary to what Oksala 
suggests at times75, his repudiation of a prescriptive stance does not help us reply to the 
fundamental question of how Foucault can vindicate his normative claims. Such a denial, 
in fact, rests upon the very respect for individual freedom. Granted that for Foucault the 
current systems of power-knowledge are supple enough to include “resources that enable 
their own critique and transformation”76, then, one might still object that his critique re-
mains unwarranted, insofar as Foucault is not able to provide an account of the normative 
value of freedom as self-transformation underpinning his enterprise. As is further con-
firmed by his refusal of prescriptivity, we have already seen that Foucault rejects justifi-
catory accounts of normativity based upon independent grounds communicated in the 
form of discursive arguments. These accounts presuppose some dangerous kind of uni-
versalistic foundations that leads to the absolutisation of an exclusive perspective on re-
ality and the correlative subordination of individuals to the ideal society it supports. What 
options other than discursive grounding are we left with to redeem Foucault’s position 
from the charge of dogmatism? Recently, Han has proposed the following strategy. Ac-
cording to her argument, the source of normativity does not lie in any type of discursive 
justification, because “this would get the ethical phenomenology wrong”. Rather, it rests 
upon the “ethical sensitivity we acquire from familiarity with our culture and practices”, 
which are part of the Enlightenment inheritance. For Han, therefore, “such sensitivity is 
the ground of our ethical life and pre-empts the need for justification”.77 Although Han is 
correct when she criticizes the appropriateness of his detractors’ demand that Foucault 
should provide us with a justificatory account of his critical remarks, I think her focus on 
the ethical aspect of Foucault’s thought overlooks that the latter is inextricably entwined 
with a political dimension whose normative requirements seem to remain unmet in her 
answer. As Oksala puts the point, one’s ethics might be based on “unthematized values 
and experiences of liberations”. The need for a normative account, however, “becomes 
 
72 Foucault, “Polemics, Politics, and Problematizations,” in Ethics, Subjectivity, and Truth: Essential Works of 
Foucault, Volume 1, ed. Paul Rabinow, trans. Robert Hurley et al. (1997), 114–115. 
73 Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?”, 316. 
74 See Foucault, “Interview with Michel Foucault”, 288. 
75 See Oksala, Foucault on Freedom, 180. 
76 Allen, The Politics of Our Selves, 43. 
77 Béatrice Han[-Pile], “Foucault, Normativity and Critique as a Practice of the Self,” Continental Philosophy 
Review 49:1 (2016), 96. 
Foucault, Normativity, and Freedom 
Foucault Studies, No. 27, 23-46.  40  
more pressing in connection with [emancipatory] politics”, since emancipatory politics 
calls for normative ideals that “can be communicated and shared as a common political 
[…] goal”.78 Consequently, below I shall propose a different reading which relies on Fou-
cault’s late essay “What is Enlightenment?”. My claim is that here Foucault offers a con-
text-dependent, explanatory account of the normative force of his critical ontology of the 
present. To begin with, Foucault maintains that the Enlightenment represents a privileged 
field of inquiry comprising economic, social, political, cultural, and technological pro-
cesses that still determine, to a large extent, our forms of thought, patterns of behaviour, 
and normative commitments. “As an enterprise for linking the progress of truth to the 
history of liberty”, Enlightenment also introduces a philosophical question that remains 
the focus of our concerns. Most importantly, however, Foucault adds that the Enlighten-
ment inaugurates a type of philosophical interrogation preoccupied with the question of 
what in the present has meaning for philosophical reflection, a modern ethos that can be 
defined as “a permanent critique of our historical era”. The shift that Foucault operates 
here is crucial. As he argues, “the thread that may connect us with the Enlightenment is 
not faithfulness to doctrinal elements”.79 An unquestioned adherence to the substantive 
themes and commitments of the Enlightenment as they have been handed down to us, in 
fact, would entrench our condition of aspectival captivity to the truth-regime of human-
ism with which Enlightenment itself has been historically identified. Rather, what may 
connect us with the Enlightenment is an ethico-political task which can be described in 
terms of the reactivation of a “limit-attitude”. By the latter Foucault means “an ethos, a 
philosophical life in which the critique of what we are is at one and the same time the 
historical analysis of the limits imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of 
going beyond them [de leur franchissement possible]”.80 To state it otherwise, far from being 
a theory or a doctrine, Foucault’s project of a critical ontology of ourselves is a practice of 
reflection on limits as “work carried out by ourselves upon ourselves as free beings”.81 
Through concrete and specific inquiries, such a practice reveals the contingent processes 
at the basis of the identities we have come to endorse and, in so doing, creates a space to 
imagine transformative modalities of relationship to ourselves and others capable of fos-
tering altered and circumscribed changes that might “pull us free from our modern age”.82 
As a result, replacing transcendental criticism with an archaeo-genealogical method of 
investigation, the normative quality of Foucault’s thought does not stem from a mere 
adoption of the historical values of the Enlightenment, including a substantive commit-
ment to autonomy.83 Rather, it derives from the effort to relaunch the emancipatory thrust 
 
78 Oksala, Foucault on Freedom, 175. 
79 Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?”, 313–314. 
80 Ibid., 319. 
81 Ibid., 316. 
82 Michel Foucault, “On the Ways of Writing History,” in Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology: Essential Works 
of Foucault, Volume 2, ed. James D. Faubion, trans. R. Hurley et al. (1998), 293, translation amended. 
83 See Oksala, Foucault on Freedom, 187. 
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of the Enlightenment project by way of a reconceptualization of freedom as an ethico-
political attitude oriented to self-transformation. 
But what is the standard to judge the validity of this normative stance? Whereas Fou-
cault does not look for further grounds, I think the answer to this question lies in the 
exemplary nature of his practice of critique. Consider the following passage:  
At every moment, […] one must confront what one is thinking and saying with what 
one is doing, with what one is. […] The key to the personal political attitude of a philos-
opher is not to be sought in his ideas, as if it could be deduced from them, but rather in 
his philosophy-as-life, in his philosophical life, his ethos.84 
The passage clearly shows the attention Foucault devotes to a stylisation of an exemplary 
coincidence between logos and bios, whereby his own life becomes the surface of explora-
tory processes of experimentation. Here, I am referring not just to the well-known descrip-
tion of each of his studies as “a fragment of autobiography”85, but also to Foucault’s mili-
tant engagement in various struggles against specific relations of power.86 Testing his 
ethos, all these activities oriented to conjugate logos and bios enable Foucault to present 
himself as an exemplum, whose normative authority derives from the recognition obtained 
from his addressees. But such exemplarity is not restricted to Foucault’s figure as public 
citizen. Rather, it comes to be reflected in the “neutralization”87 of the normative effects 
implicit in the humanist vocabulary of legitimacy, truthfulness, and authenticity Foucault 
enacts through his archaeo-genealogical reformulation of the concepts of power, 
knowledge, and the subject.88 This reformulation expresses the appeal to the value of free-
dom underpinning his model of critique as a problematizing activity directed to emanci-
pate his addressees from the current regime of truth, a theoretical operation that exempli-
fies the politics of resistance Foucault advocates against the “double bind” of modern bi-
opower.89 In brief, the confidence one can have in the validity of his normative position 
hangs upon Foucault’s ability to give embodied form to the Enlightenment ethos in his 
 
84 Foucault, “Politics and Ethics: An Interview”, 374, translation amended.  
85 Michel Foucault, “So Is It Important to Think?,” in Power: Essential Works of Foucault, Volume 3, ed. James 
D. Faubion, trans. Robert Hurley et al. (2000), 458. 
86 For a detailed reconstruction of Foucault’s political activism, see Marcelo Hoffman, Foucault and Power: The 
Influence of Political Engagement on Theories of Power (2015). One should not forget to mention the personal 
“test” to which Foucault submitted his conception of identity through the indulgence in unconventional 
sexual practices. See James E. Miller, The Passion of Michel Foucault (1993). 
87 Foucault, “What is Critique?”, 60. 
88 Although he underestimates the disclosive, experimental moment of Foucault’s notion of critique, for a 
detailed examination of the imperatives of nihilism, nominalism, and historicism underpinning Foucault’s 
archaeo-genealogical method, see Frieder Vogelmann, “Critique as a Practice of Prefigurative Emancipa-
tion,” Distinktion: Journal of Social Theory 18:2 (2017). 
89 Foucault, “The Subject and Power”, 336. Elsewhere, I have shown how in the last years of his life Foucault 
progressively comes to think of his own critical engagement as modelled on the exemplarity of the Socratic 
practice of parrhesiastic truth-telling. See Giovanni Maria Mascaretti, “Michel Foucault on Problematization, 
Parrhesia and Critique,” Materiali Foucaultiani 3, no. 5–6, (2014). On the idea of Foucault’s genealogy as exem-
plifying a creative politics of resistance, see also David Owen, Maturity and Modernity. Nietzsche, Weber, Fou-
cault and the Ambivalence of Reason (1994), 210–212.  
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style of existence as well as theoretical production, whereby the exemplarity of his critique 
ensures that the latter is as redeemed as it could be. 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Despite the soundness of this strategy, however, I believe Foucault’s normative approach 
is not deprived of serious incongruences and shortfalls which mark open-ended spaces of 
reflection for us to explore. I shall point only to three of them. Firstly, one cannot gloss 
over the clash between the interpretative-evaluative perspective described above and 
some more circumstantial observations. In a 1979 statement on the Iran Revolution, for 
instance, Foucault writes that his “theoretical ethic is […] ‘antistrategic’: to be respectful 
when a singularity revolts, intransigent as soon as power violates the universal”90. To my 
eyes, passages like this one are not only incoherent with respect to Foucault’s sceptical 
rejection of universals, but they also leave pending a whole series of normative questions: 
what constitutes the universal Foucault makes reference to? And why should we assume 
it as a reason for revolting against power?  
Secondly, as we have seen, for Foucault the dangerousness of power relations consists 
in their tendency to congeal into governmental technologies, which in turn might engen-
der states of domination. Notwithstanding the lack of a compelling analysis of what 
drives the propensity for domination in a historically specific context, however, it seems 
to me that Foucault’s appeal to freedom as self-transformation constitutes an insufficient 
normative resource to adjudicate between the various creative responses one can forward 
in order to contrast this tendency. Foucault could reply that it is not up to the critic to tell 
what is to be done. Nevertheless, he also admits that the initiatives one can undertake are 
“not equally dangerous”.91 But that is precisely where Foucault’s reasoning breaks off: 
indeed, besides his normative appeal to freedom, he never clarifies what renders one 
course of action more appropriate and desirable than another, thereby failing to consider 
the role played by argumentative practices in the elaborations of one’s critical position. 
Finally, the inadequate attention Foucault pays to the level of argumentation has im-
plications also for his conception of political struggle. Far from being limited to a confron-
tation between two opposing poles, in fact, political struggle involves complex dynamics 
that affect also those who are not directly concerned by the power relations under exam-
ination. The effectiveness of an emancipatory struggle, in fact, depends upon its capacity 
to gain a foothold in public opinion through the argumentative elucidation of the values 
and instances that propel it. In his later studies, Foucault was progressively led to 
acknowledge the relevance of this dimension, but nonetheless – due to his premature 
 
90 Michel Foucault, “Useless to Revolt?,” in Power: Essential Works of Foucault, Volume 3, ed. James D. Faubion, 
trans. Robert Hurley et al. (2000), 453. 
91 Foucault, “Ethics and Politics”. To the problematization of the prison function, for example, Foucault holds 
that “one can reply by means of revolt, reform, or the destruction of prisons”. Michel Foucault, “Luttes au-
tour des prisons,” in Dits et Écrits II, 1976–88, ed. Daniel Defert, François Ewald, and Jacques Lagrange (2001), 
813, my translation.   
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death – his remarks are left largely underdeveloped.92 In any case, that should be read as 
a symptom not of Foucault’s wish to return to the figure of the universal intellectual, but 
rather of a change of attitude promoted by the awareness of the need for a public dialogue 
aimed at charting the best options for altering the current state of affairs:  
I am a little bit irritated by an attitude, which has been mine for a long time and which 
now I do not subscribe to anymore, according to which one says: our problem is to de-
nounce and to criticize; let them sort things out with their legislation and their reforms. 
That does not seem to me a right attitude.93 
In conclusion, the opening of this article presented Fraser’s formulation of the problem of 
normativity that seems to affect Foucault’s method. Without a new paradigm of freedom 
disentangled from the normative grammar of humanism, Fraser maintains, Foucault is 
unable to answer why a fully panopticized, autonomous society should be resisted. As a 
response to her allegation, I argued for a normative reading of Foucault’s practice of cri-
tique as being marked by a distinctive appeal to the ideal of freedom as self-transfor-
mation. This enabled me to show that for Foucault the kind of society Fraser portrays 
ought to be opposed because it would constrain our experience as free agents within the 
forms of subjectivity imposed by our aspectival captivity to the prevailing regime of truth, 
which derives from the circular enmeshing of humanism with modern biopolitics. 
Whereas Foucault rejects the demand to discursively justify the right of criticism on uni-
versalistic and foundationalistic grounds, I clarified that Foucault’s late alignment of his 
thought to the Enlightenment provides us with a historically contextual, explanatory ac-
count of the normative force of his orientation to freedom. According to this account, the 
ultimate motivation of Foucault’s critical attitude is represented by a project of problem-
atization of the existing normative commitments, which aims to transform them so as to 
give new impetus to the emancipatory claims of Enlightenment modernity. Finally, I 
showed that the yardstick to evaluate the cogency of this normative enterprise is repre-
sented by the congruence Foucault establishes between what he says and what he does, 
namely by the exemplary embodiment of the critical ethos of the Enlightenment both in 
his experimental style of existence and in the intellectual production of new diagnostic 
concepts capable of unsettling the epistemological framework of humanism. Hence, I of-
fered a way to put to rest the long-standing complaint that Foucault does not tell us why 
power ought to be resisted. Still, what we have now seen in closing is that Foucault’s nor-
mative strategy remains wanting in important respects, since it does not elaborate on the 
conceptual tools necessary to develop the reconstructive possibilities opened up by his 
critical inquiries. 
 
92 Due to space constraints, I have to leave the analysis of this aspect of Foucault’s thought to another occa-
sion. For some preliminary, inspiring remarks, see Vincenzo Sorrentino, Il pensiero politico di Foucault (2008), 
246–275.  
93 Michel Foucault, “Enfermement, Psychiatrie, Prison,” in Dits et Écrits II, 1976–88, ed. Daniel Defert, 
François Ewald, and Jacques Lagrange (2001), 360, my translation. 
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